In this paper, we study the relationship between algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes and highly nonlinear functions. As applications, on one hand, a generic construction for systematic AMD codes is introduced based on highly nonlinear functions. Systematic AMD codes with new parameters can be generated from known highly nonlinear functions. Especially, several infinite classes of optimal systematic AMD codes, some with asymptotically optimal tag size, can be constructed. On the other hand, systematic AMD codes are used to construct highly nonlinear functions. The known construction by Cramer et al. [10] for systematic AMD codes turns out to be based on a special kind of functions with high nonlinearity.
algebraic immunity [33] , and authentication codes [7] , [16] ), sequences design [15] , [29] and coding theory [5] , [38] , but also for their close relationship with combinatorial designs [14] , [31] .
In this paper, we study the relationship between AMD codes and highly nonlinear functions. On one hand, we propose a generic construction of AMD codes via functions with high nonlinearity. By choosing special highly nonlinear functions such as perfect nonlinear functions, a few infinite classes of AMD codes with new parameters can be generated for both weak and strong attack models. For the weak attack model, R-optimal AMD codes have asymptotically optimal tag size can be constructed. For the strong attack model, some AMD codes generated by our construction are proved to have the minimum possible probability of successful tampering. On the other hand, we try to construct highly nonlinear functions from known AMD codes. Based on a subclass of AMD codes with more strict assumptions, highly nonlinear functions can be generated, where their nonlinearities are determined by the parameters of the corresponding AMD codes. Especially, we prove that the known construction in [10, Theorem 2] can also be explained by highly nonlinear functions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some preliminaries about AMD codes. In Section III, we construct systematic AMD codes via highly nonlinear functions for the weak attack model, whereas Section IV is devoted to construct systematic AMD codes under the strong attack model. In Section V, highly nonlinear functions are constructed based on known systematic AMD codes. Conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we recap some notation, definitions and results about AMD codes.
Definition 1: Let S be a set of plaintext messages with size m termed the source space, and G be the encoded message space, which is usually an Abelian group of order n. Consider a pair of a probabilistic encoding map E : S → G and a deterministic decoding function Dec : G → S ∪ {⊥} such that Dec(E(s)) = s with probability 1 for any s ∈ S. Let G s be the set of valid encodings of s ∈ S, i.e., G s {g ∈ G : Dec(g) = s}.
(1) The pair (E, Dec) is called a strong (m, n, ρ) algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code if for any s ∈ S, ∆ ∈ G\{0}, the probability of Dec(E(s) + ∆) ∈ {s, ⊥} is at most ρ, i.e., Pr(Dec(E(s) + ∆) ∈ {s, ⊥}) ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
(2) The pair (E, Dec) is called a weak (m, n, ρ)-AMD code if for any ∆ ∈ G \ {0} and any random s ∈ R S rather than an arbitrary one, the probability s∈S Pr(s) g∈Gs Pr(E(s) = g) Pr(Dec(g + ∆)) ∈ {s, ⊥}) ≤ ρ. (3) An AMD code (E, Dec), whether strong or weak, is called systematic if S = A 1 is an Abelian group, G is an Abelian group A 1 × A 2 × B, and the encoding has the form
for some function f :
For a systematic AMD code, the decoding function is naturally given by
Note that by randomly adding
, we can make (s, x, f (s, x)) unreadable to the adversary.
Throughout this paper, we fix the following notation for AMD codes.
• An (m, n, ρ)-AMD code is said to have equiprobable sources if Pr(s) = 1 m for any s ∈ S. • An (m, n, ρ)-AMD code is said to be equiprobable encoding if Pr(E(s) = g) = 1 |Gs| for any s ∈ S and g ∈ G s . • An (m, n, ρ)-AMD code is said to be uniform if |G s | is constant for any s ∈ S. • A uniform (m, n, ρ)-AMD code with |G s | = t for s ∈ S is said to be t-regular if it has equiprobable sources and equiprobable encoding.
For a systematic AMD code, if Pr(E(s) = (s, x = x 0 , f (s, x 0 )) = 0 for any s ∈ A 1 and x ∈ R A 2 that is for any x 0 ∈ A 2 , Pr(x = x 0 ) > 0, then it is |A 2 |-uniform. Thus, an equiprobable encoding systematic AMD code with equiprobable sources is |A 2 |-regular. Definition 2 ([10]): The tag size of an (m, n, ρ)-AMD code is ̟ = log |G| − log |S| = log n − log m.
For the convenience of theoretic analysis, for any u, k ∈ N, define effective tag size as ̟ * (k, u) = min{log |G|} − u, where the minimum is over all (|S|, |G|, ρ)-AMD codes such that |S| ≥ 2 u and ρ ≤ 2 −k . In [10] , Cramer et al. derived a lower bound for ̟ * (k, u) as follows.
Lemma 1 ([10]): For any u, k ∈ N, the effective tag size is lower bounded by
for strong AMD codes, and
for weak AMD codes, respectively.
Besides the above bound for the effective tag size of an AMD code, the following theoretic bounds on the parameters are also known.
Especially, for t-regular weak AMD codes, the probability of successful tampering is lower bounded as follows.
Lemma 3 ([30]
, [32] ): For any t-regular weak (m, n, ρ)-AMD codes, we have [32] ): A weak AMD code is R-optimal if its parameters meet the bound in Lemma 2 with equality (or Lemma 3 for the t-regular case). Here, "R" indicates that random choosing ∆ is an optimal strategy for the adversary. 
for any source s ∈ S, where ρ s is the probability of successful tampering given the source s ∈ S for a random chosen ∆.
Definition 4 ([30]):
A strong AMD code is G-optimal if its parameters meet the bound in Lemma 4 with equality. Here, "G" indicates that guessing the most likely encoding is an optimal strategy for the adversary.
III. WEAK ALGEBRAIC MANIPULATION DETECTION CODES FROM HIGHLY NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS
In this section, we propose a construction for systematic weak AMD codes via highly nonlinear functions. Systematic weak AMD codes with asymptotically optimal effective tag size are constructed in Corollaries 1 and 2, and R-optimal systematic weak AMD codes are constructed in Corollaries 3 and 5.
First of all, we recall some necessary definitions about nonlinearity of functions.
Let (A, +) and (B, +) be two Abelian groups with order n and m, respectively. Let f be a function from A to B. One robust way to measure the nonlinearity of a function f from A to B is to use the derivatives D a (f (x)) = f (x + a) − f (x) for a ∈ A, which is closely related to differential cryptanalysis [4] , [28] .
Definition 5 ([28]):
The nonlinearity P f of a function f from A to B is defined as
where Pr(D a (f (x)) = b) denotes the probability of the occurrence of the event D a (f (x)) = b.
Remark 1:
The Hamming distance between two functions f and g from A to B is defined to be d(f, g) = |{x ∈ A :
where f is linear and b is a constant. An alternative method of measuring the nonlinearity of a function f : A → B is given by the minimum Hamming distance between f and all possible affine functions from A to B [29] . This measure of nonlinearity is closely related to linear cryptanalysis [25] . For the relationship between these two definitions of nonlinearity, the reader is referred to [6] , [9] , for instances. In this paper, the former definition of nonlinearity is used.
It is easy to check (see, for example, [6] ) that P f = 1 if f is a linear function from A to B, and P f ≥ 1 |B| for any function f from A to B. The smaller the value of P f , the higher the corresponding nonlinearity of f .
where
By the probabilistic encoding map E f and the corresponding deterministic decoding function given by (2), we can define a systematic AMD code
Thus, to the convenience of analysis, we introduce the partial nonlinearity of a function, which only considers the case
where A 1 is a subgroup of A and Pr D (a1,a2) (f (x)) = b denotes the probability of the occurrence of the event D (a1,a2) (f (x)) = b.
Remark 2: By Definitions 5 and 7, we have P f ≥ Ψ f (A 1 ) for any subgroup A 1 of A.
The parameters of the constructed AMD code have the following relationship with the nonlinearity of f .
Theorem 1:
If the function f from A = A 1 × A 2 to B with partial nonlinearity Ψ f (A 1 ) has equiprobable sources and E f is equiprobable encoding, then the systematic weak AMD code (E f , Dec) generated by Construction A has parameters (n 1 , n 1 n 2 m, Ψ f (A 1 ) ≤ P f ), where |A 1 | = n 1 , |A 2 | = n 2 , |B| = m and P f denotes the nonlinearity of f .
Proof. By Construction A, we only need to prove that the probability of successful tampering is upper bounded by
According to Definitions 1 and 7, we know that the systematic weak AMD code (E f , Dec) generated by Construction A has parameters (n 1 , n 1 n 2 m, Ψ f (A 1 ) ≤ P f ), which completes the proof.
In what follows, we list some well-known highly nonlinear functions and their corresponding systematic AMD codes as applications of Construction A.
A. Linear functions
One simple but useful way to obtain functions with high nonlinearity is to use linear functions from
Applying the highly nonlinear functions in Lemma 5, the following corollary follows directly from Construction A and Theorem 1.
If the systematic weak AMD code (E L , Dec) given by (9) and (2) has equiprobable sources and E L is equiprobable encoding, then it is an
The systematic weak AMD code in Corollary 1 has an asymptotically optimal effective tag size with respect to the bound in Lemma 1, i.e., lim k→∞
Proof: By Corollary 1, there exists a systematic weak AMD code with
The first conclusion then follows from the fact that for any k, u ∈ N, we have k − 1 ≤ ̟ * (k, u) ≤ ̟. The second conclusion can be derived by the fact that
by noting that m 2 ∈ N is a constant.
B. Maiorana-McFarland's class of functions
Let r ∈ N and q be a prime power. Define a function f : Define the probabilistic encoding map E f from
where S 1 = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 2r−1 ) ∈ A 1 , s 2 ∈ R A 2 , and f is defined by (10) . If the systematic weak AMD code (E f , Dec) given by (11) and (2) has equiprobable sources and E f is equiprobable encoding, then it is an R-optimal q-regular (q 2r−1 , q 2r+1 , 1 q )-AMD code with respect to the bound in Lemma 3.
Proof. The statement that the constructed AMD code (E f , Dec) has parameters (q 2r−1 , q 2r+1 , 1 q ) directly follows from Theorem 1, Lemma 6, and the fact that it is q-regular. According to Lemma 3, we should have
which means that the constructed AMD code is R-optimal.
Corollary 4: For any k, u ∈ N, the effective tag size ̟ * (k, u) for weak AMD codes is bounded as follows:
Proof: For any given k and u, choose q = 2 k and r to be the smallest positive integer such that u ≤ k(2r − 1). According to Corollary 3, there exists a systematic weak AMD code with |A 1 | = q 2r−1 ≥ 2 u , ρ = 1 q ≤ 2 −k , and the tag size ̟ = log |G| − log |A 1 | = 2 log q = 2k. Then the claim follows from the fact that k − 1 ≤ ̟ * (k, u) ≤ ̟.
C. Dillon's class of functions
In this subsection, we recall the well-known Dillon's class of functions with perfect nonlinearity. A function g : A → B is balanced if the size of g −1 (b) is the same for every b ∈ B, which is |A|/|B|. It is known (see, for example, [6] ) that g has perfect nonlinearity if and only if for every a ∈ A \ {0}, the derivative D a (g(x)) is balanced, and this is possible only when |B| divides |A|. Let g : F q r → F q be a balanced function. Define the probabilistic encoding map E f from A 1 to G = A 1 × A 2 × B as E f (S 1 ) = (S 1 , y r , f (X, Y )) = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x r , y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y r−1 , y r , g(XY q r −2 ) ,
where S 1 = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x r , y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y r−1 ) ∈ A 1 , y r ∈ R A 2 , X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x r ), and Y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y r ). If the systematic weak AMD code (E f , Dec) given by (12) and (2) has equiprobable sources and E f is equiprobable encoding, then it is an R-optimal q-regular (q 2r−1 , q 2r+1 , 1 q )-AMD code with respect to the bound in Lemma 3.
The proof of Corollary 5 is similar to that of Corollary 3 so we omit it here. Note that although the parameters of the systematic weak AMD codes constructed in Corollaries 3 and 5 are the same, their probabilistic encoding maps are different.
IV. STRONG ALGEBRAIC MANIPULATION DETECTION CODES FROM HIGHLY NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS
In this section, we consider the systematic strong AMD codes generated by Construction A via highly nonlinear functions. We first analyze the relationship between the nonlinearity of the function f and the probability of successful tampering in Theorem 2. By choosing some special functions, we construct systematic strong AMD codes as examples in Corollaries 6 and 7.
By the probabilistic encoding map E f given by (6) and the corresponding decoding function given by (2), we can define a systematic AMD code (E f , Dec) from
In what follows, we first analyze the relationship between parameters of the strong AMD code generated by Construction A and the nonlinearity of f .
Theorem 2: Let f be a function from A = A 1 × A 2 to B with nonlinearity P f and partial nonlinearity Ψ f (A 1 ), where |A 1 | = n 1 , |A 2 | = n 2 , and |B| = m. For the equiprobable encoding case, the systematic strong AMD code (E f , Dec) generated by Construction A has parameters (n 1 , n 1 n 2 m, ρ) if and only if for any given S 1 ∈ A 1 ,
holds for any ∆ = (a 1 ,
Furthermore, if f is a perfect nonlinear function, then we have ρ ≥ P f .
Proof. By Construction A and Definition 1, the AMD code (E f , Dec) generated by Construction A has parameters (n 1 , n 1 n 2 m, ρ) if and only if for any
where the second equality follows from the fact that E f is equiprobable encoding. Therefore, (14) is equivalent with (13) .
For any a 1 ∈ A 1 \ {0} and a 2 ∈ A 2 ,
In what follows, we list a few systematic strong AMD codes with ρ = 1 |B| . Especially, we include the classes of Maiorana-McFarland functions and Dillon functions to construct such AMD codes.
Based on Theorem 2 and Lemma 4, we have the following corollary. Herein we highlight that this explicit construction was first introduced in [21] . We recall it as an application of our generic construction and the prove is only for completeness. Corollary 6 ([21]): Let A 1 = A 2 = F q r and B = F q , where we regard an element of F q r as a vector in F r q . Define the probabilistic encoding map E f from
where S 1 = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x r ) ∈ A 1 , S 2 = (x r+1 , x r+2 , . . . , x 2r ) ∈ R A 2 , and f is defined by (10) . Then, for the equiprobable encoding case, the systematic strong AMD code given by E f has parameters (q r , q 2r+1 , 1 q ), where ρ = 1 q is minimum with respect to Theorem 2. Especially, when r = 1, the q-regular AMD code is G-optimal with respect to the bound in Lemma 4.
Proof:
We first prove ρ = P f = 1 q . By Theorem 2, we only need to prove that for any
i.e., f (S 1 + a 1 , S 2 + a 2 ) = f (S 1 , S 2 ) + b has at most q r−1 solutions for S 2 ∈ F q r . Since a 1 = 0, without loss of generality, we may assume a 1 = (a 11 , a 12 , . . . , a 1r ) with a 1r = 0. Note that
where a 12 , . . . , a 1r , a 21 , a 22 , . . . a 2r ), and a 2 = (a 21 , a 22 , . . . , a 2r ). For any given (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 2r−1 ) ∈ F 2r−1 q , a 1 ∈ F q r \ {0}, and a 2 ∈ F q r , the fact h(S + ∆) − h(S) + a 1r x 2r + a 2r x r + a 1r a 2r − b = 0 has at most one solution x 2r ∈ F q implies that (16) has at most q r−1 solutions for all possible S 2 ∈ F q r , i.e., (15) holds. Then ρ = P f = 1 q by Theorem 2. The second assertion is obvious from the definitions.
Remark 3:
(1) For more general form of functions with perfect nonlinearity, similar to f in (10), the interested reader is referred to [9] , [20] , [22] , [26] .
Recalling the well-known Dillon's class of functions with perfect nonlinearity in Lemma 7, we have the following corollary. Note that the trace function Tr q r q : F q r → F q defined by Tr q r q (x) = 0≤i≤r−1 x q i is a balanced function. Corollary 7: Let A 1 = A 2 = F q r and B = F q , where we regard an element of F q r as a vector in F r q . Let {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α r } and {β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β r } be a pair of dual bases of F q r over F q , that is,
Define f :
where S 1 = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x r ) ∈ A 1 , S 2 = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y r ) ∈ R A 2 . Then, for the equiprobable encoding case, the systematic strong AMD code given by E f has parameters (q r , q 2r+1 , 1 q ), where ρ = 1 q is minimum with respect to Theorem 2. Especially, when r = 1, the q-regular AMD code is G-optimal with respect to the bound in Lemma 4.
Proof: To prove ρ = 1 q , according to Theorem 2, it suffices to prove that for any S 1 ∈ F q r , a 1 = (a 11 , . . . , a 1r ) ∈ F q r \ {(0, 0, . . . , 0)}, a 2 = (a 21 , . . . , a 2r ) ∈ F q r , and b ∈ F q ,
i.e., f (S 1 + a 1 , S 2 + a 2 ) = f (S 1 , S 2 ) + b has at most q r−1 solutions for S 2 ∈ F q r . Let
and
Since a 1 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and x q r −2 is a non-identity permutation of F q r , we have a ′ = (0, 0, . . . , 0). Without loss of generality, we may assume a ′ 11 = 0. By (17)- (20) ,
. , x r , y 2 , . . . , y r ) ∈ F q 2r−1 and C(S, a 1 , a 2 , b) is a constant determined by S, a 1 , a 2 , and b. Thus, the fact a ′ 11 = 0 means that f (S 1 + a 1 , S 2 + a 2 ) − f (S 1 , S 2 ) − b = 0 has at most q r−1 solutions for S 2 ∈ F q r , which completes the proof.
V. HIGHLY NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS FROM ALGEBRAIC MANIPULATION DETECTION CODES
By Theorems 1 and 2, we can construct systematic AMD codes from known highly nonlinear functions for both weak and strong attack models. In this section, we further analyze the relationship between AMD codes and highly nonlinear functions. Specially, we try to construct highly nonlinear functions from some given systematic AMD codes. Note that a strong (m, n, ρ)-AMD code is always a weak (m, n, ρ)-AMD code. Thus, throughout this section, we only consider the functions derived from weak AMD codes.
Let A 1 , A 2 and B be Abelian groups. For a given systematic AMD code with probabilisitic encoding map E :
Theorem 3: Let E :
be the probabilisitic encoding map of a systematic regular weak AMD code with parameters (m, n, ρ), where m = |A 1 | and n = |A 1 ||A 2 ||B|. Then the function f E :
Proof: Let ρ (∆1,∆2,∆3) denote the probability of successful tampering (∆ 1 ,
Meanwhile, for ∆ 1 = 0 and ∆ 2 ∈ A 2 \ {0}, we define
where the last inequality comes from the fact that
Therefore,
Generally speaking, from a systematic AMD code we can not determine the nonlinearity of the function f E directly. It is also related with the nonlinearity of some functions with restricted input [27] . This is mainly because that in an AMD code, we do not regard the case Dec(E(s) + ∆) = s as an adversary's successful tampering, as shown in Theorem 3. However, for a stronger setting [11] , [21] , [34] , [35] also named as stronger AMD code, the case Dec(E(s) + ∆) = ⊥ is regarded as an adversary's successful tampering. In this setting, we directly have the following result. The proof is similar, so we omit it here. i.e., it forms a stronger AMD code, then the function f E : A 1 × A 2 → B defined as (21) has nonlinearity P fE ≤ ρ.
As an application of Theorem 3, we analyse the functions derived from the systematic q-regular strong AMD codes in [10, Theorem 2].
Corollary 8: Let q be a power of a prime p, and t > 0 be an integer such that p ∤ (t + 2). Let (E h , Dec) be the known systematic q-regular strong AMD codes in [10, Theorem 2] with parameters (q t , q t+2 , t+1 q ), where the probabilistic encoding map E h : F q t → F q t × F q × F q is given by 
Then the function h(S, x) can be viewed as a function from (F q t+1 , +) to (F q , +) with nonlinearity P h ≤ t+1 q , where we regard elements of F q t+1 as vectors in F t+1 q .
Proof: According to Theorem 3, it suffices to prove that for any given S 1 ∈ F q t , P h (E,S i ) ≤ t+1 q holds, where h (E,S1) (x) = h(S 1 , x) is a function from F q to F q . By (22) , for any given S 1 = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s t ) ∈ F q t and ∆ ∈ F q \ {0}, we have h (E,S1) (x + ∆) − h (E,S1) (x) = (x + ∆) t+2 − x t+2 + 1≤i≤t s i ((x + ∆) t − x t ) = R (S1,∆) (x), where deg(R (S1,∆) (x)) = t + 1, since p ∤ (t + 2). Thus, for any S 1 ∈ F q t , P h (E,S 1 ) = max ∆∈Fq\{0} max b∈Fq |{x ∈ F q : R (S1,∆) (x) = b}| q ≤ t + 1 q , which completes the proof.
Remark 4: By Corollary 8, we know that the systematic AMD codes in Theorem 2 of [10] can also be explained by highly nonlinear functions.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between systematic AMD codes and highly nonlinear functions. Highly nonlinear functions were used to construct systematic AMD codes. By carefully choosing highly nonlinear functions, optimal systematic AMD codes, some with asymptotically optimal tag size, can be generated. Highly nonlinear functions were also constructed via systematic AMD codes.
However, in general, it is still an open problem whether we can find highly nonlinear functions to generate optimal AMD codes with optimal tag size. If it is possible, then how to construct such kinds of highly nonlinear functions is another interesting topic for future research. According to Theorem 2, the probability of successful tampering for a systematic strong AMD code is lower bounded by the perfect nonlinearity of the corresponding function. For the general case, how to construct strong AMD codes via highly nonlinear functions achieving this bound is also widely open.
